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ESSAYS AND SCHOLARSHIP
Introducing Free Speech Futures
The Knight Institute's second essay series asks leading scholars to think beyond
existing First Amendment doctrine to imagine what freedom of speech could be in
our current moment and our future. 




Freedom of speech stands at a crossroads. This much has become familiar learning. It is well
understood that threats to free speech do not come solely from governments. We know that
the media no longer acts as a reliable intermediary between information and those who
would consume it. We know that social media platforms  nd themselves having to
constantly negotiate between their role constituting the online public square and their status
as lucrative for-pro t businesses. It is clear to anyone paying attention that unregulated
speech can be more di cult to hear; we might not wish to drink from a  re hose even if we’re
thirsty. And it is obvious that these issues are not simply matters of private rights but also
reach deep into geopolitics, global economic markets, and human freedom on a broad scale.
The last decade has witnessed an explosion of sophisticated thinking and writing about
these matters. It may seem as if there is little le  to say.
The series that follows shows that impression to be mistaken. The prompt was an unusual
one. Freedom of speech is of course structured not just by social media platforms and their
users, or even by the web of statutes, regulations, and contracts that govern their behavior,
but also by an ever-present constitutional regime. The First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution famously provides that “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech,” which is broad enough on its own, but its reach extends well beyond the text of the
Constitution. The First Amendment has been interpreted to protect the commercial speech of
businesses, including purely mercenary marketing practices, about as robustly as it protects
the street-corner preacher’s take on national politics.  It has been interpreted to constrain
the government’s ability to require platforms to restrict user speech on the basis of its
content.  The breadth of its canopy has structured campus life, leading to confrontations
between unpopular speakers and those who would protest them, each side arming itself in
the language of free speech.
This series puts First Amendment doctrine on the backburner. Or perhaps better stated, it
denaturalizes First Amendment doctrine by returning, once more, to  rst principles. We have
asked authors, and we are asking their readers, to try to conceptualize the challenges we
face within the current and future information ecosystem without obsessing over the First
Amendment as it has come to be understood by courts. This may seem a quixotic exercise,
but it has a model. Conservative legal scholars in the 1980s held a di erent vision of
constitutional law writ large than was then dominant at the Supreme Court. They did not
argue, in the main, that their vision was consistent with or supported by modern doctrine, in
the way of a good common law lawyer extending the cases in his or her preferred direction.
Rather, they simply asserted that existing doctrine was not the law. There was a “lost”
Constitution, a Constitution “in exile,” that, once discovered, could rebalance the law along
preferred lines. Once conservative judges began populating the courts in greater numbers,
they had an o -the-rack alternative to the common wisdom.
¹
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Thinking in these terms is not a concession to practicality or an admission of defeat in the
courts. It is rather, an a rmative recognition that constitutional law has always been
dynamic, adjusting over time to the demands of mobilized social movements, technological
change, and political imperatives. The First Amendment is no di erent. For example, the
conventional wisdom has become that First Amendment doctrine doesn’t abide laws that
discriminate on the basis of the content of speech, and yet as late as 1952, in Beauharnais v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld a “group libel” statute, what would today be called a hate
speech law.  In the span of four decades, the so-called “commercial speech doctrine”
evolved from providing nearly minimal to nearly absolute protection for speech designed to
sell goods and services. The law around electioneering speech has yo-yoed considerably in
recent decades. Lawyers and activists within the conservative legal movement have
understood what their predecessors within the civil rights movement did as well: that
constitutional law is not a random walk but rather is charted by human beings making
intentional decisions about how to move the law.
And so imagine that you care deeply about freedom of speech. You might care for any
number of (non-mutually exclusive) reasons. Perhaps you believe freedom of speech is vital
to democratic citizenship or to the formation of a democratic culture.  Perhaps you think
personal expression is an element of personhood and therefore a precondition for human
freedom.  Perhaps you think freedom of speech is instrumental as much (or more) for
listeners as for speakers, to aid in the search for truth or to promote a culture of tolerance.
Imagine, though, that in addition to caring deeply about freedom of speech you also  nd
other values compelling. Perhaps they are the very same values to which you view free
speech as relevant or instrumental, but you think unregulated speech may threaten as much
as facilitate them. Or maybe in addition to freedom of expression, you also believe strongly
in substantive equality, or civility, or economic justice. Instead of  tting your web of value
preferences into First Amendment doctrine, what if you engineered First Amendment
doctrine to respond to those values: What would freedom of speech look like? Whom, or
what, would it protect, privilege, or target? What would platform regulation look like? And
what, if anything, are current models overlooking?
Some of the essays in the series take on the  rst, more conceptual set of questions. The  rst
contribution, Jeremy Waldron’s A Raucous First Amendment, takes seriously the notion that
free speech should be, in a word, “free.” We take as axiomatic the constitutional ideal that
governments should not punish speakers or prevent their speech without an exceptionally
good reason, but Waldron wants to focus our attention on freedom in a di erent sense:
speech, he says, should be untamed, wild, boisterous, and raucous. The ideal speech
environment is less the choreographed addresses we observe from an empty House of
Representatives chamber on C-SPAN, and closer to the unscripted and intemperate
interruptions of the British MPs every Wednesday during Prime Minister’s Question Time in
the House of Commons. Freedom of speech is not about speaking, Waldron emphasizes, but
about engagement, and so a speaker who complains of being heckled by his audience
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There is an important lesson here for, among other things, controversies over campus
speech. Freedom of speech is not the right to hold the  oor; a provocative speaker invited to
share his or her views with students should not—in the name of free speech—expect an
orderly reception. At the same time, to the extent freedom of speech as an ideal of political
morality is undisciplined in the way Waldron celebrates, its capacity to contribute to goals of
truth-seeking or political equality may be compromised. The voices most worth hearing may
lack the resources, the temperament, or the wherewithal to shout down their opponents. We
are seeing rule by the boisterous all around us; if disfavoring it is wrong, we may not want to
be right.
Such is the focus of Mary Anne Franks’s essay, The Free Speech Black Hole. Franks worries
that the constitutional ideals of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality that have come
to characterize modern freedom of speech doctrine migrate too casually to the very di erent
domain of platform regulation of online content. For Franks, freedom of speech doesn’t—and
shouldn’t—necessarily mean freedom from censorship by platforms themselves, even on the
basis of one’s views and even if platforms are powerful spaces for the exchange of ideas.
Emphasizing that free speech has historically bene ted the powerful to the exclusion of
women, minorities, and the poor, Franks argues that the market power of social media
platforms doesn’t mean, as some argue, that the same rules should apply to them as apply to
the state. To the contrary, it means that they have the leverage and the freedom to
experiment with more mindful, more egalitarian modes of speech regulation.
There is a tension here. The state action doctrine is an artifact of the very free speech
doctrine that Franks wishes to criticize as protective of white male hegemony. Many historic
victories for the cause of equality have come from courts that had the creativity and courage
to pierce the veil of private action—from striking down enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer to invalidating the transfer, in trust, of a segregated park to
city o cials in Evans v. Newton to disallowing trespass prosecutions against sit-in protestors
in Bell v. Maryland and other cases.  And so the equality argument for imploring Facebook,
say, to act as a more responsible speech regulator should not, perhaps, rest on its status as a
private company but rather on more subversive arguments against content-neutrality more
generally. How much censorship should a just First Amendment tolerate?
Tim Wu also questions the assumption that the First Amendment should view all claimants
equally. In his essay, Beyond First Amendment Lochnerism, Wu takes aim at the use of the
First Amendment to take a second bite at the apple a er a loss in the political process. Wu’s
paradigm case is Sorrell v. IMS Health, in which the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont
law that restricted the transfer of physician prescription information to data miners who
wanted to transfer the information to pharmaceutical marketers.  Drug companies
vigorously opposed the law during legislative debates but, Wu argues, they lost fair and
square. For Wu, where speech sits outside the First Amendment’s sacrosanct core of political
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Wu’s innovative proposal self-consciously evokes the constitutional theorist John Hart Ely,
who argued that U.S. courts are best deployed to police breakdowns in the democratic
process rather than to uphold substantive values. As he recognizes, the devil is in the
details. How should judges assess when a litigant was well-represented in the political
process? What kinds of legal interventions threaten core political values as opposed to other
kinds of speech? And would Wu’s approach apply across the spectrum, to other well-
resourced litigants such as, say, the ACLU, universities, or criminal defense advocacy
organizations?
Wu and Franks are both asking important questions about how the law of the First
Amendment should respond to how power is actually structured and exercised in the
twenty- rst century. In Keeping the New Governors Accountable, Victoria Baranetsky explores
similar questions as they relate to transparency. We tend to take for granted that there
should be some degree of public access to the mechanics of government decisions. The
Freedom of Information Act is premised on that view, as are rights of public access to
criminal trials. There is no similar right of access to the decisional algorithms and
decisionmaking processes of media platforms and technology companies even though these
companies wield enormous power over public life. They not only regulate public discourse
but also, for example, structure  nancial transactions, assist in surveillance, and create
sentencing algorithms. Drawing on John Dewey’s work on what later scholars have dubbed
“technological transparency”—which emphasizes the importance to self-governance of
knowing how technology functions—Baranetsky advocates mechanisms for accessing the
internal processes of technology companies, at least when they interact with criminal justice
or engage in other important public functions.
It certainly seems problematic for someone, say, to be incarcerated based on an algorithm
the particulars of which remain opaque even to the judge, much less the condemned.
Predictive justice algorithms can also reinforce racial or gender bias in disturbing ways. Still,
one might question how far Baranetsky’s proposal can go. Trade secrets are important to
innovation, just as deliberative secrecy may, in public settings, be important both to
protecting sensitive information and to successfully negotiating among a complex set of
interests. Transparency can gum up good government and good technology as much as it can
expose pathological actors or unlawful conduct.  How should we strike the right balance?
As Mike Ananny observes in Probably Speech, Maybe Free, the answer to this kind of
question exposes the nature of probability as an underexplored logic of speech systems. Our
comfort in relying on algorithms, whether to identify customers or recidivists, whether to
deliver news or search results, in recognizing child pornography or a human face, depends
on assessments of how probability relates to  nancial success, to the use of public power,
and to human welfare. When are we comfortable relying on probability? What are the
distributive e ects of false positives and false negatives? Who gets to make the assessment,
and who gets to challenge it?
 
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The problem of freedom of speech in the digital age is a problem of scale—speech is
enormously consequential, but it is o ered, targeted, and countered on a scale too vast for
human processing. Facebook’s armies of content moderators are a twentieth-century
solution to a twenty- rst century problem, the equivalent of the calvary charging at aerial
drones on horseback. Probability is a logic for taming scale, but what comes next? Ananny
uncovers a rabbit hole and o ers a sense of how far down it goes. But, like probability itself,
his essay is diagnostic. As much as probability must be understood as a logic of speech
systems, and must be interrogated to make them better, relying on probability is, in itself,
neither good nor bad. It is indeed so ubiquitous that there is a danger that a deep
exploration into probability becomes a “just so” inquiry with little prescriptive purchase.
That said, one prominent and obvious use of probability by social media platforms is in their
business models, which rely largely on targeted advertising supported by data collection
from users. These practices of course compromise user privacy to an extent as part of the
bargain we make with the platforms we use, but, as Je  Gary and Ashkan Soltani emphasize
in their essay, First Things First: Online Advertising Practices and Their E ects on Platform
Speech, the business model a ects substantive content as well. The advertisements and
other content platforms deliver to users are designed to generate engagement, and
engagement is hardly content-neutral. The old adage that “if it bleeds, it leads” applies as
much to the news, commercial products, and other targeted content on social media as to
traditional tabloids. And so it will be di cult to police the proliferation of “fake news” or
hateful content without directly addressing a business model that relies on this content to
turn a pro t (even if it does so entirely probabilistically, and therefore without conscious
“intent”). Targeted content also encourages the proliferation of “ lter bubbles” that some
believe contribute to political polarization and radicalization.
Gary and Soltani argue that traditional, “back end” forms of content moderation are doomed
to fail. “Blacklisting” troublesome content providers won’t work in practice if those
providers generate the engagements central to the platforms’ business. Direct content
moderation faces the familiar challenges of trying to use arti cial intelligence to make highly
qualitative, contextual judgments at scale. Better, Gary and Soltani say, for Congress to enact
privacy reforms (or the FTC to enact regulations) that restrict data collection or restrict the
use of certain data to target content.
One wonders if any e ort to separate platforms from their business models by  at is
quixotic. Although there is some evidence that producing targeted content isn’t really worth
the candle, there’s a lot of risk in pursuing regulatory reform that relies on making this case
to industry. Mike Masnick’s essay, Protocols Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free
Speech, o ers an approach to content moderation that attempts to align the platforms’
incentives with the social welfare. Masnick would return the internet to its roots in protocols,
which are instructions, such as HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) or SMTP (Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol) that can be tailored for users to create a compatible interface. HTTP is of
course the basis for the World Wide Web. Much of what we today think of as the internet is
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accessed through private platforms such as Facebook and Twitter that are controlled by a
single entity. This has a streamlining e ect and has enabled the platforms to collect large
amounts of data that they can then monetize, but it makes content regulation a nightmare.
Masnick argues that a shi  to more open protocols would engender competition for the kinds
of feeds that are free of unwanted content. Dangerous or hateful content could be siloed into
corners of the internet where it could do less harm, to the bene t of users.
A protocols approach has much to recommend it. Many, including Facebook’s co-founder
Chris Hughes, have argued that Facebook has “sacri ce[d] security and civility for clicks,”
and should be broken up into smaller entities.  Switching to a protocol-dominated internet
could be a way to preserve the one-stop advantages platforms o er—and which an antitrust
model jeopardizes—while minimizing the risks associated with massive data collection and
monopolistic control, a universe in which a single individual controls Facebook, WhatsApp,
and Instagram. Still, some caution is warranted. As Masnick recognizes, there is a risk that a
protocols model exacerbates the  lter bubble that has been blamed, in part, for so much
political disintegration. One might argue that some of the internet’s darker practices such as
doxxing, revenge porn, and violent threats are even more dangerous or problematic if they
happen without the target’s knowledge. Moreover, we shouldn’t underestimate the capacity
of existing tech behemoths to streamline and monetize protocols just as e ectively as they
dominate the internet as is. Getting from here to there may no longer be feasible.
The  nal essay in the series ends, then, on a note of caution. Focusing on the special
problem of “bot” regulation, Jamie Lee Williams worries that in the rush to  ght the last war,
we might overreach and forget the core values the First Amendment protects. While
acknowledging that bots spread dangerous disinformation and can lead to real-world
violence, Williams emphasizes that automated content generators are o en benign or
bene cial. Her main worry is that in the rush to adapt freedom of speech to the modern age,
by for example denying “bots” the same protections we would give to “human speech,” we
end up with censorship. She is especially wary of a model based on the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, which would require platforms to investigate user complaints within a limited
time period to determine whether to take down alleged bots. The concern is that, as in the
copyright space, the incentive to take down an alleged bot will be too strong if failing to do
so places the platform in legal jeopardy. Williams would preserve the demanding but not
fatal legal standard of “intermediate scrutiny” for e orts at bot labeling.
Williams’ essay can be taken as a broader caution that applies to the essay series more
generally. The series adds to a wealth of innovative thinking about how citizens and their
governments should respond to the many challenges posed by the modern speech
environment. But it is too early, the essay suggests, to pen a requiem for the First
Amendment. Free speech’s future will, no doubt, retain much of its past.
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